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Performing complex cryptographic tasks will be an essential element in future quantum communica-
tion networks. These tasks are based on a handful of fundamental primitives, such as coin flipping,
where two distrustful parties wish to agree on a randomly generated bit. Although it is known
that quantum versions of these primitives can offer information-theoretic security advantages with
respect to classical protocols, a demonstration of such an advantage in a practical communication
scenario has remained elusive. Here we experimentally implement a quantum coin flipping protocol
that performs strictly better than classically possible over a distance suitable for communication
over metropolitan area optical networks. The implementation is based on a practical plug and play
system, developed by significantly enhancing a commercial quantum key distribution device. More-
over, we provide combined quantum coin flipping protocols that are almost perfectly secure against
bounded adversaries. Our results offer a useful toolbox for future secure quantum communications.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
6.
33
68
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
4 A
pr
 20
14
2INTRODUCTION
Security is an imperative in all communication net-
works. Quantum communications hold the promise of
achieving a security level that is impossible to reach by
purely classical means. Indeed, information-theoretic se-
curity has been demonstrated for the cryptographic task
of distributing a secret key between two trusted and col-
laborating communicating parties using systems exploit-
ing quantum effects [1]. However, many advanced cryp-
tographic schemes belong to a model where the two par-
ties do not trust each other and hence cannot collabo-
rate. One of the fundamental primitives in this setting
is coin flipping, in which two spatially separated dis-
trustful parties share a randomly generated bit, whose
value must be unbiased [2]. This functionality, either
between two or more parties, is used in communication
networks, for instance in online gaming and in random-
ized consensus protocols (due to its equivalence to the
leader election functionality, a fundamental primitive in
distributed computing), and it is also an integral compo-
nent for secure function evaluation [3]. When multiple
parties are involved, coin flipping can be securely per-
formed when more than half of the parties are honest.
However, for two parties, which is the case that inter-
ests us here, we do not have such an honest majority.
It is known that in the asynchronous classical model,
perfectly secure coin flipping, i.e., with a zero bias, is
impossible without computational assumptions, while in
the synchronous (or relativistic) model, unconditionally
secure perfect coin flipping is possible [4], at the expense
of complex spatial configuration restrictions. Unfortu-
nately, the impossibility result in the non-relativistic set-
ting that we consider in this work holds even when proto-
cols are enhanced with quantum communication [5, 6]. A
series of theoretical works, however, have demonstrated
that the probability that an all-powerful malicious party
can bias the coin, namely the cheating probability, can
be strictly lower than 1 in the quantum setting, with an
ultimate asymptotic bound of 1/
√
2 [7–13]. Moreover, a
weaker version of coin flipping, which still remains very
useful for communication systems, can be almost per-
fectly achieved with quantum communication [14, 15].
Coin flipping therefore provides a suitable framework to
demonstrate an advantage of quantum over classical com-
munication, achieving information-theoretic security in a
non-cooperative model that is crucial for cryptographic
applications beyond key distribution.
To demonstrate such an advantage, we need to con-
sider all imperfections that naturally appear in practical
devices. For photonic systems, which constitute the cho-
sen architecture for quantum communications, imperfec-
tions typically appear in the form of losses in the channel
and measurement apparatus, and errors in the different
implementation stages. Furthermore, systems suitable
for long-distance communications over fiber-optic chan-
nels usually employ coherent light sources, thus becom-
ing vulnerable to attacks exploiting the non-deterministic
photon emission inherent in such sources [16].
Some of the aforementioned practical issues have been
addressed in recent theoretical and experimental stud-
ies. An elegant solution to the problem of loss tolerance,
i.e., the tolerance to photon losses at any communication
distance, was presented in [17], which however did not ac-
count for the presence of multi-photon pulses in coherent
light source implementations. The cheating probability
achieved by this protocol was slightly improved in sub-
sequent work [18, 19]. As a way to account for errors,
the related primitive of bit string generation was also
considered [20–22]. In practice, a first implementation
concerned a protocol that becomes insecure for any loss
[23], while a promising solution gave results that unfortu-
nately cannot be used in realistic conditions [24]. More
recently, an implementation of the loss-tolerant proto-
col [25] used an entangled-photon source to eliminate the
problem of multi-photon pulses. This was the first exper-
iment that demonstrated an advantage of quantum over
classical communication for coin flipping in the presence
of losses and errors. However, although in principle the
cheating probability bound in the implemented protocol
is independent of losses, a gain was shown in practice for
a distance of a few meters. The closely related primitives
of quantum bit commitment and oblivious transfer were
experimentally demonstrated in the noisy storage model,
where adversaries have access to an imperfect quantum
memory [26, 27]; however, these protocols do not offer se-
curity against all-powerful adversaries. Finally, quantum
bit commitment with relativistic constraints was also re-
cently implemented [28, 29].
Here, we provide a complete theoretical and experi-
mental framework for the implementation of quantum
coin flipping in practical communication scenarios. The
protocol that we consider [30] takes standard experimen-
tal imperfections (multi-photon emission, transmission
loss, detector inefficiency and dark counts) into account.
We show that our protocol can be combined with pro-
tocols that achieve almost perfect security, i.e., a bias
asymptotically close to zero, against adversaries with
bounded resources. More explicitly, if the adversary is
bounded, then the protocol guarantees almost perfect se-
curity, while in the case of an all-powerful adversary, the
protocol still guarantees a security level strictly higher
than classically possible. Providing security against ad-
versaries of varying complexity is of importance in the
context of current communication networks, where tech-
nological and computational capabilities can evolve very
rapidly. Furthermore, we experimentally implement the
protocol using a practical plug and play system, devel-
oped by significantly enhancing a commercial quantum
key distribution (QKD) device [31, 32]. The key ele-
ment of our implementation is that we take a realistic
3Alice Bob
For each i = 1, . . . ,K, Alice randomly picks a
basis αi ∈ {0, 1} and a bit ci ∈ {0, 1}.
She sends to Bob K pulses in states |Φαi,ci〉,
where |Φαi,0〉 =
√
y|0〉+ (−1)αi√1− y|1〉,
|Φαi,1〉 =
√
1− y|0〉 − (−1)αi√y|1〉.
|Φαi,ci〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ For each i = 1, . . . ,K, Bob randomly picks a
basis βi ∈ {0, 1} and measures the K pulses
in the bases {|Φβi,0〉, |Φβi,1〉}.
Let j be the position of the first measured
pulse and bj the outcome of the
measurement.
Bob sends to Alice j and a random bit b.
j, b ∈ {0, 1}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Alice sends the basis αj and the bit cj used for
the j-th pulse. αj , cj−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If the bases agree, αj = βj , and the outcomes
do not, bj 6= cj , then Bob aborts. Otherwise,
the outcome of the coin value is x = cj ⊕ b.
Box 1. Basic quantum coin flipping protocol.
approach: to account for the unavoidable errors in the
system and for coherent light source emission statistics,
we allow for a non-zero but small probability of abort
when both parties are honest, and accept the dependence
of the cheating probability on communication loss thus
departing from absolute loss tolerance [17, 25]. This con-
stitutes an important change with respect to previous
protocols and leads to a gain of three orders of magni-
tude in communication distance. Indeed, using a security
analysis pertaining to our implementation and an ap-
propriate benchmark for classical coin flipping protocols
[33], we can rigorously quantify the advantage offered
by quantum communication as a function of distance,
much in the way that the secret key fraction is calculated
in practical QKD implementations [1]. In this way, we
demonstrate a clear advantage for quantum coin flipping
with information-theoretic security, at a communication
distance suitable for metropolitan area network commu-
nications, with a system that can readily be deployed in
such networks.
RESULTS
Basic quantum coin flipping protocol
The protocol that we analyze and implement in this
work is schematically shown in Box 1 [30]. Alice sends
to Bob a fixed number K of photon pulses in states
|Φαi,ci〉, each of which is prepared independently follow-
ing a uniformly random choice of basis αi and bit ci, with
i = 1, . . . ,K, and a fixed protocol parameter y (see Sup-
plementary Figure 1 for a description of the states). Bob
measures the K pulses by selecting uniformly at random
bases βi, and replies with the position of the first success-
fully measured pulse j and a random bit b. Alice then
reveals the basis and the bit used for that position: if
the bases of the two parties agree, but the measurement
output of Bob is not the same as Alice’s bit, they abort.
In all other cases, they agree that the coin value is cj⊕ b.
A crucial feature of the protocol is the assumption that
the states are generated by an attenuated coherent light
source, which is a standard element of practical imple-
mentations. Therefore, each pulse contains a number of
photons that follows a Poisson distribution with mean
photon number µ. Standard experimental imperfections
are accounted for by introducing a probability to abort
even when both parties are honest. This probability, de-
noted H, is determined by the experimental parameters,
namely the mean photon number per pulse µ, the num-
ber of protocol rounds K, the channel length, the de-
tector quantum efficiency and dark count rate, and the
error rate. Then, optimal cheating strategies for an all-
powerful malicious party can be devised for both Alice
and Bob, leading to expressions for the maximal cheating
probabilities, pAq and p
B
q , respectively (see Supplemen-
tary Note 1 for details). These are functions of µ and K,
hence for a given desired honest abort probability, it is
possible to minimize the cheating probabilities by find-
ing optimal values for these parameters. Additionally,
the parameter y can be appropriately adjusted so that
pAq = p
B
q ≡ pq, which means that the protocol is fair.
This analysis allows us to evaluate the maximal cheat-
ing probability attained for any given honest abort prob-
ability, for different communication distances. A secu-
rity analysis allowing for a non-zero honest abort proba-
bility has also been performed for classical coin flipping
protocols [33], providing the cheating probability bound
pc = 1−
√
H/2, for H < 1/2, which is the honest abort
probability region of practical interest. This can be used
as a benchmark to assess quantitatively the advantage
offered by the use of quantum resources for coin flipping.
Experimental setup
We perform the demonstration of our quantum coin
flipping protocol using a plug and play system, which is
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Figure 1. Experimental setup of the plug and play system. The laser source at Bob’s setup emits photon pulses at 1550
nm, which are separated at a 50/50 beamsplitter and then recombined at a polarization beam splitter, after having traveled
through a short and a long arm. The latter contains a phase modulator and is appropriately arranged to transform horizontally
polarized to vertically polarized states and vice versa. The pulses then travel to Alice through the communication channel, are
reflected on a Faraday mirror, appropriately modulated and attenuated, and travel back to Bob orthogonally polarized. As a
result, the pulses now take the other path at Bob’s side and arrive simultaneously at the beamsplitter, where they interfere.
Finally, they are detected by two InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors. To implement the quantum
coin flipping protocol, Alice chooses her basis and bit values by applying a suitable phase shift to the second pulse with her
phase modulator. This modulator is also used to apply the state coefficient y. She also uses her variable attenuator to apply
the required attenuation for a desired mean photon number per pulse µ. Bob chooses his measurement basis by applying an
appropriate phase shift at the first pulse on its way back using his phase modulator. This interferometric setup compensates
for all fluctuations in the channel, which guarantees an excellent system stability. C: Circulator, BS: Beam Splitter, D0,D1:
APD Detectors, PM: Phase Modulator, FM: Faraday Mirror, VATT: Variable Attenuator, PBS: Polarization Beam Splitter,
DL: Delay Line.
a considerably enhanced version of the commercial sys-
tem Clavis2 of IDQuantique [31], designed for quantum
key distribution. The experimental setup, shown in Fig.
1, employs a two-way approach: light pulses at 1550 nm
are sent from Bob to Alice, who uses a phase modulator
to encode her information. The pulses are then reflected
by a Faraday mirror and attenuated to the desired level
before being sent back to Bob. Finally, Bob chooses a
measurement basis with his phase modulator and regis-
ters the detection events using two high-quality single-
photon detectors. When the BB84 QKD protocol [34] is
implemented by the plug and play system, the states pre-
pared by Alice and measured by Bob correspond to the
states |Φαi,ci〉 used in our quantum coin flipping protocol,
with y = 1/2. Hence, the quantum transmission stage of
the QKD protocol is identical to that of the coin flipping
protocol with the exception that, in the latter, y should
be appropriately modified to guarantee the fairness of the
implemented protocol. In practice, this parameter is set
using the control signal that drives Alice’s phase modu-
lator, which is also used to encode Alice’s basis and bit
information.
Alice sets the average photon number per pulse µ with
the variable attenuator shown in Fig. 1, using a previ-
ously established calibration relationship. It is important
to note that typical uses of the Clavis2 for QKD employ
significantly higher µ values. In Methods, we provide a
comprehensive description of the crucial improvements
made on the system to allow it to perform quantum coin
flipping, which also included appropriate adjustment of
the calibration and synchronization procedures. At the
end of the quantum transmission part of the protocol, we
derive a set of data containing the preparation and mea-
surement basis choices of Alice and Bob, respectively, and
the measurement outcomes of Bob, similarly to the raw
key data obtained in quantum key distribution experi-
ments.
Security of the implementation
The security proof of the basic quantum coin flipping
protocol provided in Ref. [30] takes into account stan-
dard experimental imperfections (multi-photon emission,
transmission loss, detector inefficiency and dark counts),
which are present in our system. This analysis, however,
is based on the following three important assumptions,
whose validity has to be carefully examined for our im-
5plementation: (i) Honest Alice can create each state with
equal probability and independently of Bob; (ii) For the
first pulse j that honest Bob successfully measures, his
basis βj and bit b are uniformly random and indepen-
dent of Alice; (iii) For the first pulse j that honest Bob
successfully measures and for any state that Alice sends
and any basis that Bob measures, the probabilities that
Bob obtained a specific outcome are exactly proportional
to the squares of the projection of Alice’s state to each
basis vector.
Even though these assumptions are routinely made in
theoretical security proofs, they do not necessarily hold in
practice unless extra caution is taken. For example, when
Alice creates her states via an entangled-photon source,
by measuring one half of the entangled pair and sending
the other half to Bob, then the probabilities of creating
each state will depend on the individual efficiencies of the
detectors she uses for her measurement. Similarly, when
Bob performs a measurement using a high-efficiency de-
tector for the outcome 0 and a lower-efficiency one for
1, then there is a bias of his outcome that Alice may
use to her advantage. Last, if a different set of detectors
is used for each of the two bases, again Bob’s probabil-
ity of successfully measuring in one basis may be much
greater than in the other one. In this case, Alice can
increase her cheating probability by revealing the latter
basis with higher probability, thus forcing Bob to accept
with higher probability.
Let us now discuss how it is possible to ensure that
the aforementioned assumptions are satisfied in our im-
plementation. Assumptions (i) and (ii), which concern
Alice’s choice of states and Bob’s choice of measurement
bases and bit b, respectively, can be addressed in a sim-
ilar way. Alice uses a quantum random number genera-
tor to pick the basis and bit that define her state, and
applies the selected phase shift using her phase modu-
lator. Similarly, Bob uses his quantum random number
generator to generate his bit b and to pick the measure-
ment basis, which is followed by the corresponding phase
shift applied by his phase modulator. Therefore, in both
cases, possible deviations from the uniform distribution
can result from the bias of the quantum random num-
ber generators and the variation in the capability of the
phase modulators to apply different phase shift values.
These effects are expected to be quite small; indeed, this
is confirmed by extensively analyzing the data obtained
from our experimental setup and deriving appropriate
bounds for these deviations (see Supplementary Note 1
for details).
Assessing assumption (iii), which concerns Bob’s basis
and outcome distributions given a detection event, turns
out to be particularly important. We would like to ensure
that when Bob has registered a detection this happens on
each one of the two bases with uniform probability. In our
experimental setup, the same set of detectors is used for
both bases so we do not expect an important deviation
from a uniform distribution, which is again confirmed by
our data. However, we observe a significant asymmetry
in the number of detections registered by each detector;
in fact, the ratio of the detection efficiencies is found to
be approximately 0.68 (see Supplementary Table 1). This
asymmetry can clearly be used by malicious Alice to in-
crease her cheating probability. To remedy this problem,
we implement a simple yet powerful solution proposed in
Ref. [26], the symmetrization of losses. Bob effectively
makes the detection efficiencies equal by throwing away
some detection events from the detector featuring higher
efficiency. Even after this symmetrization procedure, an
uncertainty on the efficiency ratio remains and can be
appropriately bounded.
In Supplementary Note 1, we provide a rigorous secu-
rity analysis of the basic quantum coin flipping proto-
col, when it is implemented using a practical plug and
play system. This analysis takes into account all stan-
dard imperfections, as well as the additional inevitable
imperfections present in our system that were previously
discussed, and is used to derive the cheating probabilities
that are necessary to assess quantitatively the advantage
offered by quantum communication for coin flipping.
Experimental quantum coin flipping results
We perform quantum coin flipping experiments for two
channel lengths, namely 15 and 25 km. In Table I we pro-
vide typical values of the experimental parameters used
in the implementations. Based on the data obtained from
the quantum transmission part of the protocol and taking
into account the symmetrization procedure, we calculate
the number of protocol rounds K that are required to
achieve a desired honest abort probability. The detection
events registered by Bob, in conjunction with the known
experimental conditions in the path between Alice and
Bob, can be used to determine the actual average pho-
ton number per pulse µ that is exiting Alice’s system.
In practice, we find that this value is slightly different
from the one estimated by the variable attenuator cali-
bration relationship. This difference is at the origin of
the uncertainty in the values of µ shown in Table I.
This procedure is performed using several values of µ
for each channel length, and then choosing the number of
rounds K to attain the desired honest abort probability.
Based on these sets of parameters, we derive the cheating
probabilities of a malicious Alice and Bob, pAq and p
B
q ,
respectively, using the extended security analysis of the
basic quantum coin flipping protocol (see Supplementary
Note 1 for the full expressions). This allows us to find,
for both channel lengths, the sets of values for µ, K and
y that minimize the cheating probability and at the same
time make the protocol fair (pAq = p
B
q ≡ pq). Note that
for simplicity, the y values of our experimental data have
615 km 25 km
Coefficient y 0.88 0.85
µ (×10−3) 2.8 ± 0.1 2 ± 0.1 5 ± 0.1 4 ± 0.1
Protocol rounds K 88000 131000 130000 174000
Cheating probability 0.916 ± 0.002 0.914 ± 0.002 0.947 ± 0.003 0.942 ± 0.003
Table I. Experimental parameter values for H = 0.8%. The parameters correspond to a fair protocol, which is ensured
by the choice of the coefficient y. The uncertainty in the values of µ is due to the difference between the value expected from
Alice’s calibrated variable attenuator setting and the value deduced from Bob’s detection events together with the known losses
in the path between Alice and Bob. The number of detection events used to calculate K is sufficiently large (typically 106)
to ensure negligible finite-size effects in our implementation; for instance, for H = 0.8%, the probability that the honest abort
probability is greater by more than 0.2% is 10−9. The cheating probability is computed using the security analysis of the basic
quantum coin flipping protocol for the plug and play implementation. The numbers in bold correspond to the values shown in
Fig. 2.
been chosen independently of the honest abort probabil-
ity value; in practice, slight modifications of these values
might be required to achieve a perfectly fair protocol for
each specific honest abort probability. The optimized
experimental parameters for an honest abort probability
H = 0.8% are shown in bold in Table I.
In Fig. 2 we show the cheating probability calculated
from our experimental data for 15 and 25 km, as a func-
tion of the honest abort probability. For each value of the
honest abort probability, the number of rounds K and
mean photon number per pulse µ has been optimized as
explained previously. The uncertainty in the estimation
of µ is illustrated by the shaded areas in the plot. To
quantify the advantage offered by quantum communica-
tion, we use the classical cheating probability bound, pc
[33]. We can see that the cheating probability is strictly
lower than classically possible for a distance of 15 km,
for a wide range of practical values of the honest abort
probability. In particular, taking into account finite-size
effects, for a range of honest abort probability from 0.4%
to 1.45%, the cheating probability is lower than classi-
cally possible unless with probability of the order 10−9.
The area corresponding to the data obtained at 25 km
is just above the classical cheating bound for all honest
abort probability values, which means that a quantum
advantage cannot be claimed in this case.
To obtain further insight into our results, we define a
gain function, as follows:
G = pc − pq,
where pc and pq are the classical cheating probability
bound and the quantum cheating probability value de-
rived from our experimental data, respectively. If the ex-
perimental data yields a positive G for a certain honest
abort probability, this means that these results cannot
be obtained by any purely classical means. We can then
use the gain as a figure of merit to assess the performance
of our quantum coin flipping implementation in a secure
communication scenario. In Fig. 3, we show the gain as a
function of distance, for a fixed honest abort probability
H = 0.8%. For the channel length of 15 km, a distance
which is sufficient for many applications requiring com-
munication over metropolitan area networks, the gain is
of the order of 0.025, while for the channel length of 25
km no positive gain can be obtained.
Note that in the distrustful model with information-
theoretic security, it is not known if it is possible for Alice
and Bob to collaborate in order to increase the robust-
ness of the implementation. This results in an inherent
limitation to the attainable communication distance in
our quantum coin flipping implementation. However, us-
ing better single-photon detectors with lower dark count
rates [35] for instance, can readily extend the range of
our protocol.
Finally, in our implementation, the classical steps of
the coin flipping protocol following the quantum trans-
mission are not performed in real time. However, it is
clear that the coin flipping rate will be dominated by
the time that it takes for K pulses to travel from Alice
to Bob. For a laser pulse repetition rate of 10 MHz, this
corresponds roughly to a few tens of coin flips per second.
As we can see in Table I, if Alice increases the average
photon per pulse exiting her system, the required number
of protocol rounds reduces, which also reduces the run-
time for the protocol, but this comes at the expense of
a slightly higher cheating probability. Again, using bet-
ter single-photon detectors can result in a substantially
lower number of required rounds. In a real communica-
tion scenario of two distrustful parties wishing to agree
on a coin value using the plug and play system, the par-
ties would be given a choice of gain values for a range
of honest abort probabilities given their communication
distance and the desired communication rate.
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Figure 2. Cheating vs honest abort for 15 and 25 km.
The cheating probability for each honest abort probability
value is calculated from the experimental data using the se-
curity analysis of the basic quantum coin flipping protocol
adapted to our implementation. The values correspond to
a fair protocol. The shaded areas are derived from the un-
certainty in the estimation of the average photon number per
pulse exiting Alice’s setup. The solid line represents the cheat-
ing probability bound for classical coin flipping protocols. For
a 15 km channel length, quantum communication leads to
lower cheating probability values than is classically possible,
for a wide range of practical honest abort probabilities. The
cheating probabilities derived at 25 km are always greater
than the classical bound.
Enhancing security against bounded adversaries
We have seen that our basic quantum coin flipping
protocol achieves information-theoretic security, which is
impossible classically. However, this security level comes
at a price of a high bias; indeed, as we see in Fig. 2,
the unbounded adversary can bias the coin with prob-
ability greater than 90%. This might not be suitable
for some applications. It is then interesting to consider
combining our protocol with protocols that achieve a bias
asymptotically close to zero against bounded adversaries.
Combining protocols with different types of security is in
fact a powerful concept, which is widely used in practice.
This allows communications to remain secure not only at
the present time but also in the future, accommodating
at the same time for different types of adversaries with
unknown or rapidly evolving technological and computa-
tional capabilities.
To construct combined protocols for quantum coin flip-
ping, we apply the following general lines: We discern
three stages, as in the commonly used protocols against
bounded adversaries, including classical protocols em-
ploying one-way functions [3] and quantum protocols in
the noisy quantum storage model [26, 36]. In the first
stage (commit), which remains unchanged from the pro-
tocols against bounded adversaries, Alice and Bob ex-
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Figure 3. Gain as a function of channel length. The gain
function is calculated as the difference between the classical
and quantum cheating probability, and illustrates the advan-
tage offered by the use of quantum communication for coin
flipping. The error bars are computed from the uncertainty
in estimating the average photon number per pulse in Alice’s
setup. The diamonds correspond to the cheating probabil-
ities achieved by our plug and play implementation for 15
and 25 km, for a fixed honest abort probability of 0.8%. A
positive gain is obtained for 15 km, while the gain remains
below the classical limit for 25 km. For comparison, previous
experimental results based on an entangled-photon source im-
plementation of a loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping protocol
[25] are also shown (circles): a positive gain was experimen-
tally obtained for a distance of 10 m, with an honest abort
probability of 1.8%, while no positive gain was possible for a
distance of 12 km.
change classical or quantum messages such that at the
end of this stage each party has almost perfectly com-
mitted to one bit, S and T , respectively. In the second
stage (encrypt), Alice and Bob encrypt their respective
random bits using the committed values. In particu-
lar, Alice sends K pulses using the states |Φαi,ci⊕S〉, for
i = 1, ...,K, and Bob replies by sending T⊕b as well as j,
the index of the first measured pulse, as in the basic pro-
tocol. In the third stage (reveal), Alice and Bob reveal
(cj , S) and (b, T ), respectively, together with additional
information depending on the underlying bounded adver-
sary model and, if nobody aborts, the value of the coin
is cj⊕b (see Supplementary Note 2 for explicit combined
protocols for models with computationally bounded ad-
versaries and adversaries with noisy quantum storage).
The combined protocols constructed as explained
above achieve an almost perfect security against bounded
adversaries, exactly as the original protocols; in addition,
when the adversaries are unbounded, they still cannot
cheat with a probability higher than the one provided by
our basic quantum coin flipping protocol, which is strictly
better than classically possible. Hence, these protocols
offer the maximal possible security guarantees.
8DISCUSSION
The results that we have presented constitute one of
the few instances of a rigorously proven and demon-
strated advantage of quantum over classical communi-
cation, which can be used for practical secure commu-
nications between distrustful parties with information-
theoretic security guarantees. We have demonstrated
this advantage using a practical plug and play system
over distances suitable for metropolitan area communica-
tion networks. This enlarges the scope of quantum cryp-
tography, in particular to practical applications where
the parties do not trust each other.
We emphasize that dealing with distrustful parties is
more complicated than the quantum key distribution sce-
nario, both in theory and in practice. For example, al-
though randomized procedures like error correction and
privacy amplification that are widely employed in QKD
have been used in the security analysis of protocols deal-
ing with bounded adversaries [37], it is an open question
whether such procedures can be used in the information-
theoretic security setting; in principle, any such step can
be used by the malicious party to his or her advantage.
Therefore, new techniques may be needed in order to deal
with the imperfections of the implementation and the in-
herent limitations to the attainable communication dis-
tance. Our results bring quantum cryptography in the
distrustful model at a comparable level of practicality as
quantum key distribution and provide means to bench-
mark this type of primitives in a way similar to QKD
protocols.
Additionally, by combining our quantum coin flipping
protocol with protocols secure against bounded adver-
saries we enhance those with a level of information-
theoretic security. This assures that an honest party will
always obtain security guarantees stronger than possible
by classical means. It is also interesting to note that
our protocol is based on a bit commitment scheme, aug-
mented only by an additional classical message from Bob
to Alice between the commit and reveal stages. This
means that our combined coin flipping protocols can also
be viewed as commitment schemes where both parties
commit some value to each other. Hence, our security
analysis can be extended in a straightforward way to
hold for bit commitment in the computational models
that we have considered. In the same way, our imple-
mentation indeed performs plug and play quantum bit
commitment. We also note that a weaker, but still very
powerful, variant, called weak coin flipping, with almost
perfect information-theoretic security is in theory possi-
ble with quantum technology [14, 15]. Our implementa-
tion is a first step towards making such protocols a real-
ity, however the quantum protocols that achieve almost
perfect security are not well understood and currently
necessitate large-dimension entangled states. Simplify-
ing such protocols is an important open question.
Last, as in practical quantum key distribution, our im-
plementation of quantum coin flipping may be vulner-
able to side-channel attacks (see Methods for details).
The power control setup placed at the entrance of Al-
ice’s system as a countermeasure for the so-called Trojan
horse attacks [38] can also be used by Alice to properly
characterize the photon distribution of the pulses sent by
Bob [39]. This is important to counter, for instance, an
attack by which Bob sends strong light pulses to Alice,
which lead to an increased average photon number per
pulse and consequently to a greater cheating probability.
Identifying potential side-channel attacks and devising
appropriate countermeasures is of great importance, as
for all practical quantum cryptographic systems.
METHODS
Plug and play quantum coin flipping system
Our quantum coin flipping implementation is based on
the commercial quantum key distribution system Clavis2
of IDQuantique. Using a QKD system for an imple-
mentation of a cryptographic primitive that requires
an entirely different security analysis and operates in
non-standard experimental conditions necessitated sev-
eral important modifications to the system. First, single-
photon detectors with very low dark count rates were in-
stalled in the quantum coin flipping system; indeed, the
honest abort probability is very sensitive to this param-
eter and so with even moderately high dark counts the
quantum advantage vanishes at any distance. The dark
count rate per detection gate of the detectors D0 and D1
were 7× 10−6 and 1.6× 10−6, with corresponding quan-
tum efficiency values of 7.7% and 5.2%, respectively. Sec-
ond, new functionalities and control signals were added
to the system to be able to apply the coin flipping pro-
tocol, in particular, those allowing us to rotate the stan-
dard BB84 states so that the optimal states for a fair
protocol could be used and those allowing us to reduce
the mean photon number per pulse µ at suitable values
for coin flipping. These values were in fact one or two
orders of magnitude lower than those typically used for
QKD. This last point was also crucial for many aspects
of the implementation, since a very low µ value hindered
the operation of several embedded calibration and testing
processes of the system, which were therefore entirely re-
designed. Such calibration procedures play an important
role in the two-way configuration of the plug and play
system, which imposes particular care in the synchro-
nization of the phase shift and attenuation signals, and
the detection gates. Among those, of particular impor-
tance is the calibration procedure involving the variable
attenuator at Alice’s site, which was actually the main
source of the uncertainty that we observe in our data. Fi-
9nally, the QKD classical post-processing procedures were
replaced by our software, which used as an input the raw
data of quantum signal exchange between Alice and Bob,
together with basis choice information. These enhance-
ments led to the development of a practical, plug and
play system that is capable of performing quantum coin
flipping in addition to key distribution.
It is important to note that the advantage of the plug
and play system with respect to other systems provid-
ing the functionalities required by our protocol is that it
offers a particularly robust and stable implementation,
which allows to perform experiments at low signal level
for long time duration, resulting in very reliable results.
This system can also potentially be used for protocols
employing decoy states [40–42]. Although the use of de-
coy states is a powerful tool for achieving practical long-
distance quantum key distribution and for improving the
performance of quantum cryptographic protocols in the
noisy storage model [37], it is not known, to the best of
our knowledge, if a protocol employing decoy states can
be devised for quantum coin flipping providing security
against all-powerful adversaries.
Side channels and practical security
Our quantum coin flipping implementation takes ex-
plicitly into account the standard imperfections (multi-
photon emission, transmission loss, detector inefficiency
and dark counts) present in practical systems. We also
consider imperfections related to asymmetries in the de-
tection efficiency and basis-dependent flaws in the com-
ponents of Alice’s and Bob’s devices, which play a crucial
role for the practical security of the implementation. It is
clear, however, that similarly to QKD experiments, fur-
ther deviations between the security proof and the actual
implementations inevitably exist and can lead to side-
channel attacks by the adversary. Although an exhaus-
tive analysis of possible side channels is out of the scope
of the present work, we examine a few prominent cases
known in the context of QKD demonstrations, some of
which are particularly relevant for the plug and play sys-
tem at the basis of our implementation.
In the setting of quantum key distribution, an efficient
eavesdropping attack that also applies to the plug and
play system consists in shifting in time the second pulse
(see Fig. 1) such that this pulse is only partially mod-
ulated by Alice’s phase modulator. This so-called phase
remapping attack [43, 44] effectively alters the relative
phase between the two pulses and allows Eve to obtain
key information for ranges of quantum bit error rate val-
ues that would otherwise be considered acceptable. In
the distrustful setting of quantum coin flipping, mali-
cious Bob attempts to maximize his cheating probability
by performing an optimal measurement to the received
states, and so reducing the probability of distinguish-
ing them cannot help him. Additionally, errors in the
state preparation performed by Alice have been consid-
ered in detail in the security analysis of our implementa-
tion (see Supplementary Note 1). Similarly, attacks ex-
ploiting the loophole introduced by detection efficiency
mismatch, such as the time-shift attack [45–47], are, in
principle, excluded by the symmetrization procedure in-
cluded in our experimental protocol. Finally, an effec-
tive countermeasure against the powerful blinding attack
[48], where the single-photon detectors are brought to a
classical operation regime and can be fully controlled by
the adversary, consists in randomly suppressing detector
gates and emitting an alarm signal in case of registered
detection events during those gates [49]. This counter-
measure is implemented in our system.
In addition to the aforementioned side-channel attacks,
it is important to note the issue of phase randomization
[50], which is an assumption typically made in security
proofs and hence should be satisfied in practice. Phase
randomization together with suitable intensity monitor-
ing are also required for the characterization of an un-
trusted source, which is particularly relevant for the plug
and play system [39]. Although all the hardware compo-
nents necessary for implementing active phase random-
ization and source characterization at Alice’s site are
available in our system, these processes were not per-
formed in real time, due mainly to the difficulty in gen-
erating random real numbers in real time and to the lim-
ited bandwidth of the threshold discriminator used for
intensity monitoring. Clearly, for any real-life implemen-
tation, following such procedures is essential.
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
|0〉
|1〉
|Φ0,0〉
|Φ1,1〉
|Φ0,1〉
|Φ1,0〉
|+〉
|−〉
θ = cos−1y
Supplementary Figure 1. Protocol States. For choice of
basis α ∈ {0, 1} and bit c ∈ {0, 1}, the honest states of
the protocol are of the form |Φα,c〉, where |Φα,0〉 = √y|0〉 +
(−1)α√1− y|1〉 and |Φα,1〉 = √1− y|0〉 − (−1)α√y|1〉, with
y ∈ ( 1
2
, 1).
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Basis Bit Detections (15 km) Detections (25 km)
0 0 84071 54915
0 1 53200 34994
1 0 82825 54279
1 1 51497 34252
Supplementary Table 1. Detection events for 15 and 25
km. These results correspond to the case when the prepa-
ration basis and bit values of Alice agree with the measure-
ment basis and outcome of Bob respectively. For the 15 km
experiment, the total number of pulses that were sent was
1.1458 × 1010 and the total number of detection events is
593272. For the 25 km experiment, 7.2905× 109 pulses were
sent and 414649 detection events were registered in total.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Supplementary Note 1 - Security Analysis
Here we provide the security analysis of the basic quan-
tum coin flipping protocol (see Box 1 in main text), when
it is implemented using a practical plug and play system.
This analysis is an extension of the security proof pro-
vided in Ref. [30] and takes into account standard exper-
imental imperfections (multi-photon emission, transmis-
sion loss, detector inefficiency and dark counts), as well
as additional imperfections specific to our experimental
setup that we explain below.
We start by stating the security assumptions made in
the security proof of Ref. [30] and provide the security
analysis when these assumptions are satisfied. Then, we
show how to ensure that these assumptions are almost
satisfied by our implementation. Last, we investigate
how the inevitable small deviations of our implementa-
tion from these assumptions affect the cheating probabili-
ties and conclude that there is a clear quantum advantage
for the 15 km channel length implementation.
Security assumptions and analysis with standard
imperfections.
We first provide a security analysis when the following
three assumptions are satisfied:
1. Honest Alice creates each of the four protocol states
|Φαi,ci〉 (see Suppl. Fig. 1) with the same probabil-
ity, independently for each pulse and independently
of Bob.
2. For the first pulse j that honest Bob successfully
measures, the distribution of his measurement basis
βj and his bit b is uniform and independent of Alice.
3. For the first pulse j that honest Bob successfully
measures, if the state of the pulse is ρ, then for each
basis βj , the probabilities of the two outcomes are
〈Φβj ,0|ρ|Φβj ,0〉 and 〈Φβj ,1|ρ|Φβj ,1〉.
We describe the optimal cheating strategies of ma-
licious Alice and Bob and derive the corresponding
cheating probabilities when the above assumptions are
satisfied.
Malicious Alice. Let us assume that Alice tries to bias
the coin towards the value x = 0 (the analysis for x = 1 is
similar). We also assume that Bob successfully measured
the first pulse, thus providing an upper bound to Alice’s
cheating probability. Honest Bob has therefore picked
a uniformly random basis β and has detected the qubit
sent by Alice. He replies with the uniformly random bit b
in the next step of the protocol. Alice then has to reveal
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a basis α and the value c = b, so that the coin value is
0. If α 6= β, Bob accepts. If α = β, Bob checks whether
his measurement outcome agrees with c. Note that here
and in the following, we drop for simplicity the index j
used in the description of the basic quantum coin flipping
protocol for the first measured pulse by Bob, which is
used to establish the coin value.
The analysis is exactly the same as in Ref. [17], which
is based on the rigorous analysis in Ref. [51] of the origi-
nal protocol of Ref. [7]. The only difference between our
protocol and the one in Ref. [7], is that, there, Bob waits
for Alice’s announcement of the basis before measuring.
Hence, the analysis in Ref. [51] corresponds to the case
that Alice reveals the same basis as Bob; in the other
case, she can perfectly cheat since Bob always accepts.
Alice’s optimal strategy consists of finding the state
that will maximize the average probability of revealing
bit 0 or 1 (since Bob’s choice b is uniform). However,
when Alice needs to reveal c = 0 or c = 1, she also has the
choice of which basis to reveal. This might enable Alice
to increase her cheating probability by creating a state in
a large Hilbert space, sending part of it to Bob and after
Bob’s message, performing some general operation on her
part to decide which basis to reveal. Nevertheless, this
analysis has already been done in Ref. [51]. More pre-
cisely, in Ref. [51] (section 6.4.1), it is first shown that for
any protocol where there are two honest pure states that
correspond to bit 0 and two honest pure states that corre-
spond to bit 1 (as in our case), Alice’s optimal strategy is
to send the state that maximizes the average probability
of revealing (α = 0, c = 0) and (α = 1, c = 1) or of reveal-
ing (α = 1, c = 0) and (α = 0, c = 1). In high level, this
is true since the states in the pairs {|Φ0,0〉, |Φ1,1〉} and
{|Φ1,0〉, |Φ0,1〉} are closer to each other than the orthogo-
nal states in the pairs {|Φ0,0〉, |Φ0,1〉} and {|Φ1,0〉, |Φ1,1〉}
(see Suppl. Fig. 1).
For the first case, a simple calculation (see Ref. [51])
shows that the optimal over all possible states is in fact
the pure state |+〉; then, after reception of Bob’s bit b,
Alice reveals (α = b, c = b). For the second case, the
optimal state is shown to be the pure state |−〉; then,
Alice reveals (α = 1− b, c = b). The probability that she
forces the outcome 0 is then in both cases:
Pr[x = 0|same bases] = 1
2
+
√
y(1− y),
where y is the coefficient of the honest states. Note that
Alice could also decide to prepare any mixture of the
states |+〉 and |−〉 and achieve exactly the same cheating
probability. When the bases are different, according to
the protocol, Bob always accepts the coin. Since Bob’s
basis choice is uniformly random and independent of Al-
ice, Alice can bias the coin with probability:
pAq ≤
3
4
+
1
2
√
y(1− y) (1)
Malicious Bob. The optimal cheating strategy of an
all-powerful Bob is complex and involves his ability to
know the number of photons in each of the K pulses sent
by Alice. He can then accordingly optimize his POVM
on all K pulses to maximize his cheating probability. It
is important to note that, under Assumption 1, honest
Alice uses a uniformly random bit ci to prepare the state
in each pulse i, and all cis are independent of each other.
We upper bound Bob’s cheating probability by consider-
ing that his cheating probability is 1 in all cases except
for four events Ai (i = 1, . . . , 4), for which we find appro-
priate bounds as shown below.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that Bob’s
desired outcome is x = 0 and let Pr[x = 0|Ai] be
the probability that Bob will force his preference when
event Ai has taken place, which happens with probability
Pr[Ai]. According to the protocol, the number of photons
per pulse i follows the Poisson distribution pi = µ
ie−µ/i!,
where µ is the mean photon number. We consider the
following events, for K number of rounds:
A1: : Bob receives only vacuum pulses. This event
occurs with probability Pr[A1] = e
−µK . Since
Bob has no knowledge of Alice’s bit, which is uni-
formly random, he picks a random bit, and hence
Pr[x = 0|A1] = 1/2.
A2: : Bob receives vacuum pulses, at least one single-
photon pulse and no two- or more-photon pulses.
This event occurs with probability Pr[A2] = (p0 +
p1)
K −pK0 . We will assume here that Bob does not
actually receive any vacuum pulses, which can only
increase his cheating.
To analyze cheating Bob, we use the very strong
loss-tolerant properties of our coin flipping proto-
col. From the definition of the states of the honest
protocol (with y ∈ ( 12 , 1)), we have
ρ0 =
1
2
|Φ0,0〉〈Φ0,0|+ 1
2
|Φ1,0〉〈Φ1,0|
ρ1 =
1
2
|Φ0,1〉〈Φ0,1|+ 1
2
|Φ1,1〉〈Φ1,1|
It is easy to see that the maximum eigenvalue of ρ0
and ρ1 is equal to y and their minimum eigenvalue
is equal to (1−y) (in fact, ρ0 = y|0〉〈0|+(1−y)|1〉〈1|
and ρ1 = (1− y)|0〉〈0|+ y|1〉〈1|). Hence,
∀m ∈ {0, 1}, 2(1− y)I  ρm  2yI,
where I is the totally mixed state and A  B means
that the matrix B−A is positive. From the above,
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we can conclude that
ρ0  1− y
y
ρ1 , ρ1  1− y
y
ρ0.
Hence, there exist positive norm-1 matrices ξ0 and
ξ1 such that
ρ0 =
1− y
y
ρ1 +
2y − 1
y
ξ0, ρ1 =
1− y
y
ρ0 +
2y − 1
y
ξ1.
Then, we can rewrite ρ0 and ρ1 as
ρ0 = yξ0 + (1− y)ξ1 , ρ1 = (1− y)ξ0 + yξ1. (2)
Let {Mi,b}i∈[K],b∈{0,1} the POVM that Bob applies
on all K pulses to determine the index i that he will
announce as his first measured pulse, as well as his
guess b for Alice’s bit ci. We have
∑
i,bMi,b = I.
Let Mi = Mi,0 + Mi,1 be the POVM element that
corresponds to the event that Bob outputs i as his
first measured pulse. We have for Bob’s cheating
probability
Pr[x = 0|A2] =
∑
i∈[K]
Pr[Bob outputs (i, b = ci)]
=
∑
i
Pr[i] · Pr[b = ci|i]
Fix any index of a pulse j and a value cj for Alice’s
bit on pulse j. In this case, Bob’s density matrix is
ρcj in the register that corresponds to the j-th pulse
and the totally mixed state I in the other registers.
We denote this state by ρcj ⊗ I¬j . Note that the
necessary property is that this is a product state
and the state that corresponds to the remaining
pulses is independent of cj . The proof below would
also work for any other state instead of I¬j , given
that this state is also independent of cj .
When Bob performs the above POVM and outputs
index j, then after the measurement he has the
(unnormalized) mixed stateMj(ρcj⊗I¬j). Our goal
is to determine how well Bob can guess the value cj
when he outputs the index j, in other words, how
well he can distinguish the states Mj(ρ0⊗ I¬j) and
Mj(ρ1⊗I¬j). Using the optimality of the Helstrom
measurement, Eq. (2), and the fact that ρ0 + ρ1 =
ξ0 + ξ1, we have that:
Pr[b = cj |j]
≤ 1
2
+
1
2
· ||Mj(ρ0 ⊗ I¬j)−Mj(ρ1 ⊗ I¬j)||tr
Tr(Mj(ρ0 ⊗ I¬j)) + Tr(Mj(ρ1 ⊗ I¬j))
=
1
2
+
1
2
· (2y − 1)||Mj(ξ0 ⊗ I¬j)−Mj(ξ1 ⊗ I¬j)||tr
Tr(Mj(ξ0 ⊗ I¬j)) + Tr(Mj(ξ1 ⊗ I¬j))
≤ y
Since the above holds for any j, we can conclude
that
Pr[x = 0|A2] =
∑
i
Pr[i] · Pr[b = ci|i] ≤ y
A3: : Bob receives only vacuum pulses and one two-
photon pulse. This events occurs with probabil-
ity Pr[A3] = Kp2p
K−1
0 . Let σ0 and σ1 the mixed
states that correspond to the two-photon pulse Bob
receives when Alice’s bit is 0 or 1; then, the op-
timal measurement to distinguish these states is
given by the Helstrom measurement and yields
Pr[x = 0|A3] = 12 + 12 || 12σ0 − 12σ1|| = y.
A4: : Bob receives vacuum pulses, one two-photon
pulse and at least one single-photon pulse. This
events occurs with probability Pr[A4] = Kp2[(p0 +
p1)
K−1 − pK−10 ]. As before, we assume that Bob
receives no vacuum pulses, which can only increase
his cheating.
Let {Mi,b}i∈[K],b∈{0,1} the POVM Bob applies on
all K pulses to determine the index i he announces
as his first measured pulse, as well as his guess b
for Alice’s bit ci. Let j the index that corresponds
to the two-photon pulse. We have
Pr[x = 0|A4] =
∑
i∈[K]
Pr[Bob outputs(i, b = ci)]
= Pr[j] · Pr[b = cj |j] +
∑
i 6=j
Pr[i] · Pr[b = ci|i]
From the analysis of A2, we know that for any
single-photon pulse with index i, we have Pr[b =
ci|i] ≤ y. Note that again, the state that corre-
sponds to the remaining pulses, including the two-
photon one, is independent of ci. Let q = Pr[j],
then we have
Pr[x = 0|A4] = q · Pr[b = cj |j] + (1− q)y
Let us now study the probability that Bob can
guess the bit cj that corresponds to the two-photon
pulse. Using the notation from the previous events,
the overall state Bob has in case cj = 0 is σ0 ⊗ I¬j
and the state he has in case cj = 1 is σ1⊗ I¬j . The
optimal probability for guessing cj is given by the
optimal POVM on the K pulses that distinguishes
the states σ0⊗I¬j and σ1⊗I¬j . This is again given
by the Helstrom measurement and has probability
Popt =
1
2 +
1
2 || 12σ0 ⊗ I¬j − 12σ1 ⊗ I¬j || = y.
Let us now describe a specific strategy that Bob
can perform in order to guess the value cj of
the two-photon pulse: He performs the POVM
{Mi,b}i∈[K],b∈{0,1} and if the output is (j, 0) he out-
puts 0, if the output is (j, 1) he outputs 1, and in
all other cases he outputs a uniformly random bit.
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Let z the success probability of this strategy. Then,
z = qPr[b = cj |j] + 1−q2 . This yields the inequality
2z− 1 ≤ q. Also, we have z ≤ y, from the optimal-
ity of the Helstrom measurement. This gives:
Pr[x = 0|A4]
≤ q · Pr[b = cj |j] + (1− q)y
= z + (1− q)(y − 1/2) ≤ z + (2− 2z)(y − 1/2)
= 2z(1− y) + 2y − 1 ≤ 2y(1− y) + 2y − 1
= −2y2 + 4y − 1
By combining the above results, and noticing that Bob’s
cheating is the same if he wants x = 1, we find that Bob
can bias the coin with probability:
pBq ≤
4∑
i=1
Pr[Ai] · Pr[x = 0|Ai] +
[
1−
4∑
i=1
Pr[Ai]
]
· 1 (3)
As we see from Eqs. (1) and (3), the cheating probabil-
ities depend on the number of rounds K, the protocol
parameter y and the mean photon number µ. We can
make the protocol fair (i.e. pAq = p
B
q ), by changing the
parameter y.
Satisfying the security assumptions with the plug and play
system.
The previous security analysis holds when the three
security assumptions are satisfied. In practice, however,
these assumptions, which concern honest Alice and Bob,
may not be fulfilled. In the following, we assess the devia-
tions from the security assumptions present in our system
and describe the procedures that need to be performed
to recover those assumptions almost perfectly and conse-
quently the security of the implemented protocol as well.
In our experimental setup, for every round i, honest Al-
ice uses a quantum random number generator to pick the
values of the basis αi and bit ci. She then generates the
corresponding state |Φαi,ci〉 by applying a suitable phase
shift with a phase modulator. On his side, Bob uses a
quantum random number generator to pick the basis βi,
for every i, applies the appropriate phase shift with his
phase modulator and uses two InGaAs avalanche pho-
todiode single-photon detectors to register the outcome
of his measurement. He also uses a quantum random
number generator to pick the bit b.
We now examine each of the three assumptions we
made previously. We will see that the first two assump-
tions hold almost perfectly since the only deviations
come from the possible bias of the quantum random
number generator and the variation in the capability
of the phase modulator to apply different phase shift
values. In order to fulfill the last assumption, however,
we need to add to the protocol a symmetrization stage
to remedy for an asymmetry in the two detection
efficiencies.
Assumption 1: Alice’s choice of states. We examine
Alice’s ability to generate each of the four protocol states
with the same probability for each pulse. The only way
to assess this in practice is by analyzing Bob’s detection
events. We calculate the probability that honest Alice
had picked each basis over the entire set of Bob’s detec-
tion events. The distribution of this basis should ideally
be uniform. Based on the experimental data correspond-
ing to the 15 km implementation, we find that the basis
choice is close to uniform:
Pr[α = 0] = 0.5048
Pr[α = 1] = 0.4952
For the 25 km experiment, the corresponding probabili-
ties are 0.5038 and 0.4962, respectively.
Next, we would like to ascertain whether the distribu-
tion of Alice’s bit for each pulse is also uniform and more-
over that it remains uniform even conditioned on Alice’s
choice of basis. Again we can only assess this by looking
at the detection events of Bob. However, it is necessary
that we remove the possible effects of Bob’s detectors on
this distribution, since Bob uses two different detectors
for the two measurement outcomes (see Fig. 1 in main
text). For this reason, we collected data again from our
experiment, where this time, by appropriately adding a
phase shift via Bob’s phase modulator, we interchanged
the role of the two detectors for each of the two bases.
The analysis of the obtained data shows that the ratio of
detection events corresponding to bits 0 and 1 for each
of the bases is almost perfectly inverted. This implies
that Alice produces states that correspond to 0 and 1
almost uniformly, even when we condition on her basis
choice (with a deviation of 0.003). This is not surpris-
ing since the state choice is performed using a quantum
random number generator and a single phase modulator
that applies one of four possible phase shifts.
By performing extensive tests, we can bound the devi-
ation of Alice’s state distribution from the uniform one,
using a single A:
∀k, l ∈ {0, 1}, |Pr[α = k|c = l]− 1/2| ≤ 0.005 , A(4)
∀k, l ∈ {0, 1}, |Pr[α = k, c = l]− 1/4| ≤ 0.004 ≤ A
∀k, l ∈ {0, 1}, |Pr[c = l|α = k]− 1/2| ≤ 0.003 ≤ A
Since this bound on the deviation is very small, we do
not proceed in any correction as part of the experi-
mental procedure, but we incorporate the bound A in
our complete security analysis described in a following
section. This naturally slightly increases Bob’s cheating
probability.
Assumption 2: Bob’s choice of bases and bit b. Next,
we examine the probability that Bob has chosen each
14
basis β for the first pulse he successfully measured. Note
that what is important is the distribution of the basis for
the first measured pulse and not over all pulses, since this
is the information which is relevant to the coin outcome.
The distribution of this basis should ideally be uniform.
Note that the same pair of detectors is used for measuring
in both bases (see Fig. 1 in main text). From the analysis
of the experimental data for the 15 km implementation,
we find:
Pr[β = 0] = 0.5006
Pr[β = 1] = 0.4994
For the 25 km experiment, the corresponding probabil-
ities are 0.5003 and 0.4997, respectively. The above re-
sults demonstrate that the distribution of Bob’s bases
is indeed very close to uniform. Again, this is not sur-
prising since, as mentioned before, the only devices that
are used for the basis and bit choices in our implementa-
tion are quantum random number generators and phase
modulators, which are expected to be very reliable.
Concerning the distribution of the bit b, we note that
the quantum random number generator used in our ex-
periment (Quantis) provides very strong guarantees for
the uniformity of each output bit and the independence
between different output bits. In fact, we extensively
tested the bias of the outputs of Quantis and we can
bound the deviation of the probability of each bit from
uniform, even conditioned on any number of previous
bits, by Q = 0.0006.
Hence, in our implementation, we can bound, for the
first pulse Bob successfully measures, the deviation of his
distribution of basis and bit from uniform, as follows:
∀k, l ∈ {0, 1}, |Pr[β = k, b = l]− 1/4| ≤ 0.00061 , B
(5)
Again, since the deviation is very small we do not
proceed in any correction in practice, however we
incorporate the bound B in our security analysis. This
slightly increases Alice’s cheating probability.
Assumption 3: Bob’s detection. In order to calculate
the detection efficiency ratio, we focus on the number
of detection events that occur when Alice and Bob have
used the same bases and agree on the output values (see
Suppl. Table 1). It is clear that there exists a signif-
icant asymmetry in the number of detections observed
by each detector, which leads to an important bias in
the announced outcomes by Bob. Our previous analy-
sis has practically excluded that this event is due to an
imbalance in the states Alice prepares, hence it is pre-
dominantly due to an asymmetry in the two detection
efficiencies in Bob’s system.
After subtracting the events that are due to dark
counts from the total number of detection events, taking
also into account the slight asymmetry of Bob’s choice of
basis, we find that the detector efficiency ratio, for both
channel lengths, is η1/η0 = 0.68 ± 0.015, where η0 and
η1 correspond to detectors D0 and D1, respectively (see
Fig. 1 in main text). This difference in detection efficien-
cies can lead to a sophisticated attack by Alice, where
she sends a different state than |+〉 or |−〉 (depending
on which bit is favored by the asymmetry). This can
increase her cheating probability substantially. An effi-
cient solution proposed in Ref. [26] is the symmetriza-
tion of losses, by which Bob effectively makes the two
detection efficiencies equal by throwing away some de-
tection events. More specifically, whenever Bob detects
an event on detector D0, he discards it with probability
32%. This was implemented in our experiments. Even
after the symmetrization procedure, some deviation on
the detection efficiency ratio may still remain, and by
testing our detectors can be bounded as follows:∣∣∣∣η1η0 − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.022 , ′B (6)
The bound ′B , which again holds with probability negli-
gibly away from 1, is incorporated in the security analysis
that follows and increases Alice’s cheating probability.
Security analysis for the plug and play system
We now provide a general security analysis of the
basic quantum coin flipping protocol, which incorporates
the imperfections quantified by the bounds in Eqs. (4),
(5), and (6), and calculate the cheating probabilities in
our implementation.
Malicious Alice. Let us assume that Alice tries to bias
the coin towards the value x = 0 (the analysis for x = 1
is similar) and that Bob successfully measured the first
pulse. We assume that the probabilities of Bob’s distri-
bution of the basis β he chose for the first successfully
measured pulse and his bit b deviate at most B from
1/4. We also assume that Alice has the power to choose
among all these distributions the one that maximizes her
cheating probability.
As in the uniform case, Alice’s optimal strategy con-
sists of finding the state that will maximize the average
probability of revealing bit 0 or 1. Even in the presence
of the small deviation of Bob’s choices, the arguments
in Ref. [51] still show that in our protocol, Alice’s op-
timal strategy is to send the state that maximizes the
probability of revealing:
1. (α = 0, c = 0) when b = 0 and (α = 1, c = 1) when
b = 1, or
2. (α = 1, c = 0) when b = 0 and (α = 0, c = 1) when
b = 1.
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Note that, due to the deviation B , these two optimal
strategies may not achieve the same cheating probability,
which means that we need to calculate both of them and
take the maximum of the two. We remind that in the
case of B = 0, the two optimal strategies correspond
to sending the states |+〉 and |−〉 and they achieved the
same cheating probability.
Let us analyze the first strategy (the analysis of the
other one is similar). Let ρ the state sent by Alice. The
probability that the protocol outputs x = 0 is:
Pr[x = 0] =
∑
k,l
Pr[β = k, b = l] Pr[x = 0|β = k, b = l]
where β is Bob’s choice of basis and b is Bob’s bit, for
the successfully measured pulse. According to Alice’s
strategy, when Bob picks β 6= b, then Alice reveals a
different basis than Bob’s, which means he accepts with
probability 1. In other words
Pr[x = 0|β = 0, b = 1] = Pr[x = 0|β = 1, b = 0] = 1.
To upper-bound Alice’s cheating probability, we at-
tribute the highest possible probability to these events,
more precisely:
Pr[β = 0, b = 1] = Pr[β = 1, b = 0] =
1
4
+ B
Pr[β = 0, b = 0] = Pr[β = 1, b = 1] =
1
4
− B
Then, we need to compute the probability that the proto-
col outputs 0, when Alice sends the state ρ and Bob picks
β = b for the successfully measured pulse. Note that, by
definition of the first strategy, when (β = 0, b = 0), Alice
reveals (α = 0, c = 0) and when (β = 1, b = 1), she re-
veals (α = 1, c = 1). Let us assume that the ratio of the
detection efficiencies of Bob’s system deviates from 1 by
at most ′B and Alice knows this distribution. Then, the
probabilities are
Pr[x = 0|β = 0, b = 0] = 〈Φ0,0|ρ|Φ0,0〉η0〈Φ0,0|ρ|Φ0,0〉η0 + 〈Φ0,1|ρ|Φ0,1〉η1
Pr[x = 0|β = 1, b = 1] = 〈Φ1,1|ρ|Φ1,1〉η1〈Φ1,0|ρ|Φ1,0〉η0 + 〈Φ1,1|ρ|Φ1,1〉η1
We can see that the maximum value of the above ex-
pressions, i.e., the maximum of Alice’s cheating probabil-
ity, can be achieved by a pure state that belongs to the
Hilbert space defined by the honest states |Φα,c〉. This
is the same result as in the uniform case, where the op-
timum was achieved by the states |+〉 and |−〉. Note
that the expressions are concave in ρ and the extremal
points of the set of density matrices are pure states; in
addition, any part of ρ outside the Hilbert space of the
honest states leaves the expressions unchanged.
Since {|Φ0,0〉, |Φ0,1〉} is a basis for this space, we have
that there exists a state that maximizes Alice’s cheating
of the form:
|χ〉 = cosφ|Φ0,0〉+ sinφ|Φ0,1〉
We can then optimize over all angles φ to find an upper
bound on Alice’s cheating probability pAq = max{Pr[x =
0],Pr[x = 1]}. The analysis for x = 1 gives the same
results. Note that we have upper-bounded the cheating
probability by giving Alice knowledge of the efficiency
ratio and also the power to attribute in the best way the
deviations.
In the case B = 
′
B = 0, we find that the optimal
cheating strategy is for φ = pi/4 − θ and we recover
Alice’s original optimal cheating strategy, which leads to
the cheating probability in Eq. (1).
Malicious Bob. Now let us see how cheating Bob can
exploit the deviation in Alice’s distribution of choices.
We assume that Alice’s probabilities deviate from uni-
form by at most A (see Eq. (4)). We analyze the four
cheating events for Bob in a very similar way as before.
Bob is assumed to want a coin value x = 0 (the same
analysis holds for x = 1).
A1: Bob receives only vacuum pulses. Bob picks b equal
to the most probable bit according to Alice’s dis-
tribution. We have Pr[x = 0|A1] ≤ 12 + A. Note
again that the value of Alice’s bit has deviation A
from uniform, even conditioned on any of the other
bits she has encoded in different pulses.
A2: Bob receives vacuum pulses, at least one single-
photon pulse and no two- or more-photon pulses.
Let ρ0 and ρ1 the state of a single-photon pulse cor-
responding to Alice’s bit 0 and 1, in case her distri-
bution is uniform and let ρ′0 and ρ
′
1 the states when
Alice’s distribution deviates from uniform by at
most A. We will show that there exists y
′ ∈ ( 12 , 1),
such that
∀m ∈ {0, 1}, 2(1− y′)I  ρ′m  2y′I,
Then, we can follow the same analysis as in the
uniform case and conclude that Pr[x = 0|A2] ≤ y′.
To compute y′, note that
ρ′0 = Pr[α = 0|c = 0]|Φ0,0〉〈Φ0,0|
+ Pr[α = 1|c = 0]|Φ1,0〉〈Φ1,0|
ρ′1 = Pr[α = 0|c = 1]|Φ0,1〉〈Φ0,1|
+ Pr[α = 1|c = 1]|Φ1,1〉〈Φ1,1|
Since these probabilities deviate at most A from
1/2, we have for all m ∈ {0, 1}
(1− 2A)ρm  ρ′m  (1 + 2A)ρm ⇔
(1− 2A)2(1− y)I  ρ′m  (1 + 2A)2yI⇔
2(1− (y + 2A))I  ρ′m  2(y + 2A)I
Similarly to the analysis of A2 in the uniform case,
we have Pr[x = 0|A2] ≤ y + 2A.
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A3: Bob receives only vacuum pulses and one two-
photon pulse. Let σ0 and σ1 the mixed states that
correspond to the two-photon pulse Bob receives
when Alice’s bit is 0 or 1 in case Alice’s distribution
is exactly uniform, and σ′0 and σ
′
1 the mixed states
that correspond to the two-photon pulse Bob re-
ceives when Alice’s distribution deviates from uni-
form by A:
σ′0 = Pr[α = 0|c = 0](|Φ0,0〉〈Φ0,0|)⊗2
+ Pr[α = 1|c = 0](|Φ1,0〉〈Φ1,0|)⊗2
σ′1 = Pr[α = 0|c = 1](|Φ0,1〉〈Φ0,1|)⊗2
+ Pr[α = 1|c = 1](|Φ1,1〉〈Φ1,1|)⊗2
Again, the optimal distinguishing measurement
gives:
Pr[x = 0|A3]
=
1
2
+
1
2
||Pr[c = 0]σ′0 − Pr[c = 1]σ′1||
≤ 1
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣12σ0 − 12σ1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ A ||σ0 + σ1||
≤ y + 2A
A4: The analysis is similar to the case of the uni-
form distribution. Bob receives vacuum pulses, one
two-photon pulse and at least one single-photon
pulse. This events occurs with probability Pr[A4] =
Kp2[(p0 + p1)
K−1− pK−10 ]. We will assume here as
before that Bob receives no vacuum pulses, which
can only increase his cheating.
Let {Mi,b}i∈[K],b∈{0,1} be the POVM that Bob ap-
plies on all K pulses to determine the index i Alice
and Bob will use as well as his guess b for Alice’s
bit ci. Let j the index that corresponds to the two-
photon pulse. We have
Pr[x = 0|A4]
=
∑
i∈[K]
Pr[Bob outputs(i, b = ci)]
= Pr[j] Pr[b = cj |j] +
∑
i 6=j
Pr[i] · Pr[b = ci|i]
From the analysis of A2, we know that for any
single-photon pulse with index i, we have Pr[b =
ci|i] ≤ y + 2A. Let q = Pr[j], then we have
Pr[x = 0|A4] = q · Pr[b = cj |j] + (1− q)(y + 2A)
Let us now study the probability that Bob can
guess the bit cj that corresponds to the two-photon
pulse. Using the notation from the previous events,
the overall state Bob has in case cj = 0 is σ
′
0 ⊗ γ¬j
and the state he has in case cj = 1 is σ
′
1 ⊗ γ¬j for
some state γ¬j . The optimal probability for guess-
ing cj is given by the optimal POVM on the K
pulses that distinguishes the states σ′0 ⊗ γ¬j and
σ′1 ⊗ γ¬j . This is again given by the Helstrom
measurement and gives probability Popt =
1
2 +
1
2 ||Pr[c = 0]σ′0⊗γ¬j−Pr[c = 1]σ′1⊗γ¬j || ≤ y+2A.
Let us now describe a specific strategy that Bob
can perform in order to guess the value cj of
the two-photon pulse: He performs the POVM
{Mi,b}i∈[K],b∈{0,1} and if the output is (j, 0) he out-
put 0, if the output is (j, 1) he outputs 1, and in
all other cases he outputs the most probable value.
Let z the success probability of this strategy. Then,
z = qPr[b = cj |j] + (1− q)( 12 + A). This yields the
inequality 2z−1−2A1−2A ≤ q. Also, we have z ≤ y+2A,
from the optimality of the Helstrom measurement.
This gives us:
Pr[x = 0|A4]
= q · Pr[b = cj |j] + (1− q)(y + 2A)
= z + (1− q)(y − 1/2 + A)
≤ z + (1− 2z−1−2A1−2A )(y − 1/2 + A)
= 21−2A
(
z(1− y − 2A) + y − 12 + A
)
Since the coefficient of z is positive for the values
of y and A that we consider, we can upper bound
this probability by using z ≤ y + 2A and get:
Pr[x = 0|A4] ≤ (−2y
2 + 4y − 1) + A(6− 8y − 8A)
1− 2A
Note that for A = 0, we recover the initial bound.
By combining the above results, and noticing that Bob’s
cheating is the same if he wants x = 1, we find that Bob
can bias the coin with probability:
pBq ≤
4∑
i=1
Pr[Ai] · Pr[x = 0|Ai] +
[
1−
4∑
i=1
Pr[Ai]
]
· 1 (7)
By inserting the specific values for A, B , 
′
B from our
implementation, given in Eqs. (4), (5), and (6), we cal-
culate the cheating probability of the protocol. For a
channel length of 15 km there is a clear quantum gain.
For 25 km, we see that the quantum cheating probabil-
ity, taking into account the worst possible case for all the
imperfections, is slightly bigger than the classical bound,
and hence we cannot provably show any gain in this case
(see Fig. 2 in main text).
An important part of our analysis is the symmetriza-
tion procedure that results in throwing away a lot of de-
tection events, thus requiring more rounds K in order
to achieve a specific honest abort probability. This in-
creases the cheating probability since a malicious Bob
benefits from the increased number of rounds.
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Supplementary Note 2 - Combined quantum coin
flipping protocols
In this section, we show how to combine the ba-
sic quantum coin flipping protocol with protocols that
achieve almost perfect security against adversaries that
possess limited resources. We consider, in particular,
computationally bounded adversaries and adversaries
with noisy quantum storage.
Computationally-bounded quantum coin flipping
The computationally bounded protocol shown in Sup-
plementary Protocol 1, uses an injective one-way function
f , upon which Alice and Bob have previously agreed [3].
In the commit stage of the protocol, Alice and Bob choose
random strings, xA and xB , respectively, and commit
to the bits h(xA) and h(xB) by exchanging f(xA) and
f(xB), where h is a hardcore predicate of f . Hardcore
predicates make it impossible to guess the value h(x)
from f(x) with probability greater than one half. An
example of a hardcore predicate function is the parity
of the bits in a string, since it can be proven [3] that
given the parity and the image of the string, it is not
feasible to guess the string itself. Moreover, since f is an
injective one-way function, by sending the values f(x),
neither of the two parties can lie about the value of their
chosen string and thus change the value h(x). Hence,
at the end of this stage Alice and Bob have almost per-
fectly committed to h(xA) and h(xB). In the encrypt
stage, for i = 1, ...,K, Alice randomly selects αi and ci
and sends the K quantum states |Φαi,ci⊕h(xA)〉 to Bob,
prepared in the same way as in the basic protocol. Bob
performs a measurement in the randomly selected bases
{|Φβi,0〉, |Φβi,1〉}, and replies with the position j of the
first successfully measured pulse and a random bit b en-
crypted as b ⊕ h(xB). Finally, in the reveal stage, Alice
and Bob reveal their strings and check that they are con-
sistent with the function outputs exchanged during the
commit phase. They also exchange their chosen bit and
Bob aborts only if αj = βj and his measurement outcome
does not agree with cj . If he does not abort, the value
of the coin is cj ⊕ b. Note that the encrypt stage and
the first step of the reveal stage correspond to our basic
quantum coin flipping protocol, slightly modified to fit
the underlying computationally bounded model.
For the security analysis, if Alice is computationally
bounded, then she cannot guess the value h(xB) with
probability greater than one half, which means that Bob’s
bit b is perfectly hidden when Bob sends b ⊕ h(xB).
Therefore, the protocol remains almost perfectly secure
against Alice. If Bob is computationally bounded, then
the bits cj are perfectly hidden as cj ⊕ h(xA), hence the
protocol remains almost perfectly secure against Bob. If,
on the other hand, the parties are unbounded, they can
perfectly compute the hardcore predicates and the se-
curity of the protocol becomes exactly the same as the
security of our basic coin flipping protocol.
Alice Bob
choose xA
f(xA)−−−−−−−−−−→ choose xB
f(xB)←−−−−−−−−−−
choose {αi, ci}K1
|Φαi,ci⊕h(xA)〉−−−−−−−−−−→ measure in {βi}K1
j, b⊕h(xB)←−−−−−−−−−− j: first measured pulse,
b ∈R {0, 1}
xA, cj , αj−−−−−−−−−−→
xB , b←−−−−−−−−−−
Coin: cj ⊕ b
Supplementary Protocol 1. Computationally-bounded
coin flipping.
Noisy storage quantum coin flipping
In the noisy storage protocol [26], shown in Supple-
mentary Protocol 2, the parties first agree on an error-
correcting code. This is followed by a prepare stage,
where Alice sends to Bob 2n quantum states, which are
the states used in the basic protocol, with y = 1/2.
Bob measures the states using randomly chosen bases
{bˆi}2n1 . At the end of this procedure, Alice has a string
containing the bits used to construct the states, namely
X2n = Xn1X
n
2 , and Bob has a string containing his mea-
surement results, namely X˜2n = X˜n1 X˜
n
2 . If the choices
of the states and the measurement bases are uniformly
random, then the strings agree on approximately half of
the positions.
The parties then perform the main coin flipping pro-
tocol. In the commit stage, Alice and Bob commit to
bits DA = Ext(X
n
1 , r) and DB = Ext(X˜
n
2 , r˜), respec-
tively, where Ext : {0, 1}n ⊗ R → {0, 1} is a family of
2-universal hash functions, and (r, r˜) are strings chosen
by Alice and Bob in order to randomly pick a hash func-
tion from this family. To this end, they first calculate the
syndromes w = Syn(Xn1 ) and w˜ = Syn(X˜
n
2 ) based on
the chosen error-correcting code, and commit to the ex-
tractor function values by exchanging the syndromes and
half of the bases’ values they used in the measurements.
In the encrypt stage, Alice encrypts her bit choices cj
by sending K states |Φαj ,cj⊕DA〉, prepared as in the ba-
sic protocol. Bob chooses randomly βj and measures in
{|Φβj ,0〉, |Φβj ,1〉}. He then encrypts a bit b by sending
b ⊕ DB to Alice, together with the index m of the first
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successfully measured pulse. Finally, in the reveal stage,
Alice and Bob reveal their string and bit values and check
that for the positions with the same bases, Xn2 coincides
with X˜n2 and X
n
1 coincides with X˜
n
1 , respectively. They
also check that the syndromes and extractor outputs cor-
respond to the received strings.
Alice Bob
choose {bi, xi}2n1
|Φbi,xi 〉−−−−−−−−−−→ measure in {bˆi}2n1
String: X2n = Xn1 X
n
2 String: X˜
2n = X˜n1 X˜
n
2
|Xn1 | = |Xn1 | = n, |X˜n1 | = |X˜n1 | = n
Wait time ∆t
w = Syn(Xn1 ), w˜ = Syn(X˜
n
2 ),
string r string r˜
DA = Ext(X
n
1 , r)
{bi}n/21 , w, r−−−−−−−−−−→ DB = Ext(X˜n2 , r˜)
{b˜i}nn/2+1, w˜, r˜←−−−−−−−−−−
choose {αj , cj}K1
|Φαj,cj⊕DA 〉−−−−−−−−−−→ measure in {βj}K1
DB⊕b, m←−−−−−−−−−− m: first measured
pulse
Xn1 ,cm−−−−−−−−−−→
check:
X˜n2 , b←−−−−−−−−−− check:
Syn(X˜n2 ) = w˜ Syn(X
n
1 ) = w
Ext(X˜n2 , r˜) = DB Ext(X
n
1 , r) = DA
Coin: cm ⊕ b
Supplementary Protocol 2. Noisy storage coin flipping.
If the measurement outcome for the first measured
pulse agrees with the revealed bit for the same choice
of bases or if the bases are different, they agree on the
coin, otherwise they abort. Again, the encrypt stage and
the first step of the reveal stage correspond to the basic
quantum coin flipping protocol.
The noisy storage limitation together with the wait-
ing time ∆t that is imposed on the parties, forces them
to measure any quantum state they might have wanted
to keep unmeasured in order to improve their cheating
strategy. Bob is forced to measure the states sent by
Alice and Alice is forced to measure whatever entangled
share she may have kept when sending the states to Bob.
Concerning the security analysis, if Alice has noisy
storage, then she cannot guess the value DB with proba-
bility greater than one half, hence Bob’s bit b is perfectly
hidden from her when Bob sends b⊕DB . Therefore, the
protocol remains almost perfectly secure against Alice.
If Bob has noisy storage, then again the bits cj are per-
fectly hidden as cj⊕DA and the protocol remains almost
perfectly secure against Bob. If, on the other hand, the
parties have perfect memory, they can perfectly compute
the values DA and DB and the security of the protocol
reduces exactly to the security of our basic quantum coin
flipping protocol.
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